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1 Introduction
The principal-agent problem is central to many economic settings, such as employment
contracts, insurance and regulation. A vast literature analyzing this problem has found
that it is typically di¢ cult to solve: even in simple settings, the optimal contract can
be highly complex (see, e.g., Grossman and Hart (1983)). The rst-order approach is
often invalid, requiring the use of more intricate techniques. Even if an optimal contract
can be derived, it may not be attainable in closed form, which reduces tractability 
a particularly important feature in applied theory models. In addition, the contract is
typically contingent upon many specic features of the environment, a number of which
(such as the agents risk aversion) are di¢ cult to observe and thus use to guide the contract
design in practice. Even those parameters that can be observed do not appear to a¤ect
real-life contracts as much as existing theories predict.
Against this backdrop, Holmstrom and Milgrom (1987, HM) made a major break-
through by showing that the optimal contract is linear in prots under certain conditions.
Their result has since been widely used by applied theorists to justify the focus on linear
schemes, which leads to substantial tractability. However, HM emphasized that their re-
sult only holds under exponential utility, continuous time, Gaussian noise, and a pecuniary
cost of e¤ort. In certain settings, the modeler may wish to use discrete time or binary
noise for clarity, or decreasing absolute risk aversion for empirical consistency.
Can tractable contracts be achieved in broader settings? When allowing for alternative
utility functions or noise distributions, do these details start to a¤ect the optimal contract?
What factors do and do not matter for the incentive scheme? These questions are the focus
of our paper. We rst consider a discrete-time, multiperiod model where, in each period,
the agent rst observes noise and then exerts e¤ort, before observing the noise in the next
period; he consumes only in the nal period. We solve for the cheapest contract that
implements a given, but possibly time-varying, path of target e¤ort levels. The optimal
incentive scheme is both tractable (i.e. attainable in closed form) and detail-neutral:
its functional form is independent of the noise distribution and the agents reservation
utility, and depends only on how the agent trades o¤ the benets of cash against the
cost of providing e¤ort.1 The irrelevance of the noise distribution occurs even though each
action, except the nal one, is followed by noise, and so he faces uncertainty when deciding
his e¤ort level. Using recent advances in continuous-time contracting (Sannikov (2008)),
1For brevity, we call such a contract detail-neutral. This term emphasizes that certain details of
the contracting situation do not matter for the functional form of the contract (whereas they matter in
earlier theories). It is not meant to imply that the functional form is independent of all parameters. Note
that our notion of detail-neutral contracts is a separate concept from Wilsons (1987) detail-free auction
mechanisms.
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we show that the contract has the same functional form in a continuous-time model where
noise and e¤ort occur simultaneously.
In addition to noise and reservation utility, the optimal contract is also independent
of the agents utility function in two cases. First, if the cost of e¤ort is pecuniary as in
HM (i.e. can be expressed as a subtraction to cash pay), the incentive scheme is linear
in output for any utility function, even if the cost of e¤ort is itself non-linear. Second,
if the agents preferences are multiplicative in cash and e¤ort, the optimal contract is
independent of utility and log-linear, i.e. the percentage change in pay is linear in output.
An application to CEO incentives demonstrates the implications that ow from a tractable
contract structure. For CEOs, the appropriate output measure is the percentage stock
return, and multiplicative preferences are theoretically motivated by Edmans, Gabaix and
Landier (2008). The optimal contract thus sets the required percentage change in pay for
a percentage change in rm value, i.e. the elasticity of pay with respect to rm value. This
analysis provides a theoretical justication for using elasticities to measure incentives, a
metric previously advocated by Murphy (1999) on empirical grounds.
We allow the target e¤ort path to depend on the noise realizations. The optimal
contract now depends on messages sent by the agent to the principal regarding the noise,
since the state of nature may a¤ect the productivity of e¤ort. However, it remains
tractable and detail-neutral, for a given action functionthat links the observed noise to
the principals recommended e¤ort level. We nally solve for the optimal action function
chosen by the principal. In classical agency models, the action chosen by the principal
is the result of a trade-o¤ between the benets of e¤ort (which are increasing in rm
size) and its costs (direct disutility plus the risk imposed by incentives, which are of
similar order of magnitude to the CEOs wage). We show that, if the output under the
agents control is su¢ ciently large compared his salary (e.g. the agent is a CEO who
a¤ects total rm value), these trade-o¤ considerations disappear: the benets of e¤ort
swamp the costs. Thus, maximum e¤ort is optimal in each period, regardless of the noise
outcome. By contrast, if output is small, maximum e¤ort may not be optimal for some
noise realizations. We show that the optimal action function can still be solved for if the
cost function is a¢ ne.
The maximum e¤ort principle2, when applicable, signicantly increases tractability,
since it removes the need to solve the trade-o¤ required to derive the optimal e¤ort level
when it is interior. Indeed, jointly deriving the optimal e¤ort level and the e¢ cient con-
tract that implements it can be highly complex. Thus, papers that analyze the second
(implementation) problem typically assume a xed target e¤ort level (e.g. Grossman and
2We allow for the agent to exert e¤ort that does not benet the principal. The maximum e¤ort
principlerefers to the maximum productive e¤ort that the agent can undertake to benet the principal.
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Hart (1983), Dittmann and Maug (2007) and Dittmann, Maug and Spalt (2008)). Our
result rationalizes this approach: if maximum e¤ort is always optimal, the rst problem
has a simple solution there is no trade-o¤ to be simultaneously tackled and the analysis
can focus on the implementing contract.
In sum, for a given target e¤ort level, the optimal implementation is detail-neutral.
Moreover, if output is su¢ ciently large, the optimal action itself does not depend on
model parameters, and so the overall contract is detail-neutral. All of the above results
are derived under a general contracting framework, where the contract may depend on
messages sent by the agent to the principal, and also be stochastic.
Our analytical framework yields a number of implications. First, it shows that tractable
contracts can be derived even without assuming exponential utility, Gaussian noise and
continuous time. This result may be of use for future contracting models, as it shows that
tractability may be achieved in quite broad settings. For example, certain models may
require decreasing relative risk aversion for empirical consistency and/or discrete time for
clarity. Second, it demonstrates what details of the environment do and do not matter for
the optimal contract. The functional form depends only on how the agent trades o¤ cash
against e¤ort and not the noise distribution or reservation utility, and is independent of
utility with a pecuniary cost of e¤ort or multiplicative preferences. This detail-neutrality
contrasts with many classical principal-agent models (e.g. Grossman and Hart (1983)),
where the optimal contract is contingent upon many specic features of the contracting
situation. This poses practical di¢ culties, as some of the important determinants are
di¢ cult to observe, such as the noise distribution and agents utility function. Our results
suggest that the contract is robust to such parametric uncertainty. Furthermore, even those
parameters that can be observed do not appear to a¤ect real-life contracts: for example,
Prendergasts (2002) review of the evidence nds that incentives show little correlation
with risk. Our model o¤ers a simple potential explanation for why contracts typically
do not depend on as many details of the contracting situation as a reading of the extant
literature would suggest these details in fact do not matter.
We achieve simple contracts in other settings than HM due to a di¤erent modeling
setup. HM use exponential utility to eliminate wealth e¤ectsof prior period outcomes
on the current period decision, thus removing the intertemporal link between periods and
allowing the multiperiod problem to collapse into a succession of identical static problems.
The removal of wealth e¤ects also leads to independence of the reservation wage. By
contrast, we achieve tractability by modeling the noise before the action in each period, as
in theories in which the agent observes a state of naturebefore taking his action, or total
output before deciding how much cash ow to divert.3 This assumption has little e¤ect on
3This timing assumption cannot be made within the HM framework since HM model e¤ort as the
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the economics of the problem since the agent is still exposed to risk in every period (except
the nal one), but is a technical device that allows the multiperiod model to be solved by
backward induction, so that it becomes a succession of single-period problems. A potential
intertemporal link remains since high past outcomes mean that the agent already expects
high consumption and thus may have a lower current incentive to exert e¤ort. This issue
is present in the Mirrlees (1974) contract if the agent can observe past outcomes. (A high
reservation wage has the same e¤ect.) The optimal contract must address these issues:
if the utility function is concave, the contract must be convex so that, at high levels of
consumption, the agent is awarded a greater number of dollars for exerting e¤ort, to o¤set
the lower marginal utility of each additional dollar. If the cost of e¤ort is in monetary
terms, high past outcomes decrease the benets of cash and the cost of e¤ort equally, and
so incentives are preserved even with a linear contract.
In addition to its results, the papers proofs import and extend some mathematical
techniques that are relatively rare in economic theory and may be of use in future models.
We employ use the subderivative, a generalization of the derivative that allows for quasi
rst-order conditions even if the objective function is not everywhere di¤erentiable. This
concept is related to Krishna and Maenners (2001) use of the subgradient, although
the applications are quite di¤erent. These notions also allow us to avoid the rst-order
approach, and so may be useful for future models where su¢ cient conditions for the
rst-order approach cannot be veried.4 We also use the notion of relative dispersion
for random variables to prove that the incentive compatibility constraints bind, i.e. the
principal imposes the minimum incentive slope that induces the target e¤ort level. We
show that the binding contract is less dispersed than alternative solutions, constituting
e¢ cient risk sharing. A similar argument rules out stochastic contracts, where the payout
is a random function of output.5 We extend a result from Landsberger and Meilijson
(1994), who use relative dispersion in another economic setting.
This paper builds on a rich literature on the principal-agent problem. Grossman and
Hart (1983) demonstrate how the problem can be solved in discrete time using a dynamic
programming methodology that avoids the need for the rst-order approach. HM show
selection of probabilities, so noise inevitably follows the action. We thus depart from the framework and
model e¤ort as an increment to mean output, so that the noise/state of nature can be realized rst.
4See Rogerson (1985) for su¢ cient conditions for the rst-order approach to be valid under a single
signal, and Jewitt (1988) for situations in which the principal can observe multiple signals. Schaettler
and Sung (1993) derive su¢ cient conditions for the rst-order approach to be valid in a large class of
principal-agent problems, of which HM is a special case.
5With separable utility, it is straightforward to show that the constraints bind: the principal should
o¤er the least risky contract that achieves incentive compatibility. However, with non-separable utility,
introducing additional randomization by giving the agent a riskier contract than necessary may be desirable
(Arnott and Stiglitz (1988)) an example of the theory of second best. We use the concept of relative
dispersion to prove that constraints bind.
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that optimal contracts are linear in prots in continuous time (where noise is automatically
Gaussian) if the agent has exponential utility and controls only the drift of the process; they
show that this result does not hold in discrete time. A number of papers have extended
their result to more general settings, although all continue to require exponential utility.
In Sung (1995) and Ou-Yang (2003), the agent also controls the di¤usion of the process
in continuous time. Hellwig and Schmidt (2002) show that linearity can be achieved in
discrete time, under the additional assumptions that the agent can destroy prots before
reporting them to the principal, and that the principal can only observe output in the
nal period. Our multiperiod model yields linear contracts while allowing the principal
to observe signals at each interim stage. Mueller (2000) shows that linear contracts are
not optimal in HM if the agent can only change the drift at discrete points, even if these
points are numerous and so the model closely approximates continuous time.
A number of other papers investigate the parameter dependence of optimal contracts.
DeMarzo and Fishman (2007) consider a discrete-time, dynamic model where the agent
can divert cash ows. They show that the optimal contract can be implemented using the
standard securities of equity, long-term debt and a credit line; under certain conditions,
the terms of debt and the credit line are independent of the severity of the agency problem.
The agent is risk-neutral in their setting; here, we study the impact of the utility function
and noise distribution. DeMarzo and Sannikov (2006) show that the model is particularly
tractable in continuous time, where the incentive scheme can be solved as a di¤erential
equation. Wang (2007) derives the optimal contract under uncertainty and nds the limit
of this contract as uncertainty diminishes. The limit contract depends on the agents risk
aversion and the characteristics of the risk environment.
This paper proceeds as follows. In Section 2 we derive tractable and detail-neutral
contracts in both discrete and continuous time, as well as considering a specic application
to CEO compensation. While this section holds the target e¤ort level xed, Section 3 allows
it to depend on the noise realization and derives conditions under which the maximum
productive e¤ort level is optimal for all noise outcomes. Section 4 concludes. The Appendix
contains proofs and other additional materials; further peripheral material is in the Online
Appendix.
2 The Core Model
2.1 Discrete Time
We consider a T -period model; its key parameters are summarized in Table 1. In each
period t, the agent observes noise t, takes an unobservable action at, and then observes
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the noise in period t+ 1. The action at is broadly dened to encompass any decision that
benets output but is personally costly to the principal. The main interpretation is e¤ort,
but it can also refer to rent extraction: low at reects cash ow diversion or the pursuit
of private benets. We assume that noises 1; :::; T are independent with open interval
support
 
t; t

, where the bounds may be innite, and that 2; :::; t have log-concave
densities.6 We require no other distributional assumption for t; in particular, it need not
be Gaussian. The action space A has interval support, bounded below and above by a
and a. (We allow for both open and closed action sets and for the bounds to be innite.)
After the action is taken, a veriable signal
rt = at + t: (1)
is publicly observed at the end of each period t.
Insert Table 1 about here
Our assumption that t precedes at is featured in models in which the agent observes a
state of naturebefore taking his action (e.g. Harris and Raviv (1979), La¤ont and Tirole
(1986) and Baker (1992))7 and cash ow diversion models where the agent observes total
output before choosing how much to divert (e.g. DeMarzo and Sannikov (2006), DeMarzo
and Fishman (2007).) Note that this timing assumption does not make the agent immune
to risk in every period, except the nal one, his action is followed by noise. Even in a
one-period model, the agent bears risk as the noise is unknown when he signs the contract.
In Section 2.2 we show that the contract has the same functional form in continuous time,
where  and a are simultaneous.
In period T , the principal pays the agent cash of c.8 The agents utility function is
E
"
u
 
v (c) 
TX
t=1
g (at)
!#
: (2)
g represents the cost of e¤ort, which is increasing and weakly convex. u is the utility
function and v is the felicity9 function which denotes the agents utility from cash; both
6A random variable is log-concave if it has a density with respect to the Lebesgue measure, and the
log of this density is a concave function. Many standard density functions are log-concave, in particular
the Gaussian, uniform, exponential, Laplace, Dirichlet, Weibull, and beta distributions (see, e.g., Caplin
and Nalebu¤ (1991)). On the other hand, most fat-tailed distributions are not log-concave, such as the
Pareto distribution.
7In such papers, the optimal action typically depends on the state of nature. We allow for such
dependence in Section 3.1.
8If the agent quits before time T , he receives a very low wage c.
9We note that the term felicity is typically used to denote one-period utility in an intertemporal
model. We use it in a non-standard manner here to distinguish it from the utility function u.
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are increasing and weakly concave. g, u and v are all twice continuously di¤erentiable. We
specify functions for both utility and felicity to maximize the generality of the setup. For
example, the utility function (
ce g(a))
1

1  is commonly used in macroeconomics and features
a non-linear u and v. u(x) = x denotes additively separable preferences; v(c) = ln c
generates multiplicative preferences. If v(c) = c, the cost of e¤ort is expressed as a
subtraction to cash pay. This is appropriate if e¤ort represents an opportunity cost of
foregoing an alternative income-generating activity (e.g. outside consulting), or involves
a nancial expenditure. Note that even if the cost of e¤ort is pecuniary, it remains a
general, possibly non-linear function g (at). HM assume v(c) = c and u(x) =  e x, i.e. a
pecuniary cost of e¤ort and exponential utility.
The only assumption that we make for the utility function u is that it exhibits nonin-
creasing absolute risk aversion (NIARA), i.e.  u00 (x) =u0 (x) is nonincreasing in x. Many
commonly used utility functions (e.g. constant absolute risk aversion u (x) =  e x and
constant relative risk aversion u (x) = x1 = (1  ),  > 0) exhibit NIARA. This assump-
tion turns out to be su¢ cient to rule out randomized contracts.
The agents reservation utility is given by u 2 Imu, where Imu is the image of u, i.e.
the range of values taken by u. We also assume that Im v = R so that we can apply the
v 1 function to any real number.10 We impose no restrictions on the contracting space
available to the principal, so the contract ec() can be stochastic, nonlinear in the signals
rt, and depend on messages Mt sent by the agent. By the revelation principle, we can
assume that the the space of messages Mt is R and that the principal wishes to induce
truth-telling by the agent. The full timing is as follows:
1. The principal proposes a (possibly stochastic) contract ec (r1; :::; rT ;M1; :::;MT )
2. The agent agrees to the contract or receives his reservation utility u.
3. The agent observes noise 1, then sends the principal a message M1, then exerts
e¤ort a1:
4. The signal r1 = 1 + a1 is publicly observed.
5. Steps (3)-(4) are repeated for t = 2; :::; T .
6. The principal pays the agent ec (r1; :::; rT ;M1; :::;MT ).
10This assumption could be weakened. With K dened as in Theorem 1, it is su¢ cient to assume that
there exists a value ofK which makes the participation constraint bind, and a threat consumptionwhich
deters the agent from exerting very low e¤ort, i.e. infc v (c)  infat
P
t g (at) 
P
t g
0 (a)
 
t + a

t

+K.
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As in Grossman and Hart (1983), in this section we x the path of e¤ort levels that
the principal wants to implement at (at )t=1;::;T , where a

t > a and a

t is allowed to be time-
varying.11 An admissible contract gives the agent an expected utility of at least u and
induces him to take path (at ) and truthfully report noises (t)t=1;::;T . Since the principal
is risk-neutral, the optimal contract is the admissible contract with the lowest expected
cost E [ec].
We now formally dene the principals program. Let Ft be the ltration induced by
(1; :::; t), the noise revealed up to time t. The agents policy is (a;M) = (a1; :::; aT ;M1; :::;MT ),
where at and Mt are Ft measurable. at is the e¤ort taken by the agent if noise (1; :::; t)
has been realized, and Mt is a message sent by the agent upon observing (1; :::; t). Let
S denote the space of such policies, and (S) the set of randomized policies. Dene
(a;M) = (a1; :::; a

T ;M

1 ; :::;M

T ) the policy of exerting e¤ort a

t at time t, and sending
the truthful message Mt (1; :::; t) = t. The program is given below:
Program 1 The principal chooses a contract ec (r1; :::; rT ;M1; :::;MT ) and a Ft measurable
message policy (Mt )t=1:::;T , that minimizes expected cost:
minec() E [ec (a1 + 1; :::; aT + T ;M1 ; :::;MT )] ; (3)
subject to the following constraints:
IC: (at ;M

t )t=1:::T 2 arg max
(a;M)2(S)
E
"
u
 
v (ec (a1 + 1; :::; aT + T ;M1; :::;MT ))  TX
s=1
g (as)
!#
(4)
IR: E
"
u
 
v (ec ())  TX
t=1
g (at )
!#
 u: (5)
In particular, if the analysis is restricted to message-free contracts, (4) implies that the
time-t action at is given by:
81; :::; t; at 2 argmax
at
E
"
u
 
v (ec (a1 + 1; :::; at + t; :::; aT + T ))  g (at)  TX
s=1;s 6=t
g (as)
!
j 1; :::; t
#
:
(6)
Theorem 1 below describes our solution to Program 1.12
11If at = a, then a at wage induces the optimal action.
12Theorem 1 characterizes a contract that is optimal, i.e. solves Program 1. Strictly speaking, there
exist other optimal contracts which pay the same as (7) on the equilibrium path, but take di¤erent values
for returns that are not observed on the equilibrium path.
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Theorem 1 (Optimal contract, discrete time). The following contract is optimal. The
agent is paid
c = v 1
 
TX
t=1
g0 (at ) rt +K
!
, (7)
whereK is a constant that makes the participation constraint bind (E
"
u
 P
t g
0 (at ) rt+
K  Pt g (at )
!#
=
u). The functional form (7) is independent of the utility function u, the reservation utility
u, and the distribution of the noise . These parameters a¤ect only the scalar K. The
optimal contract is deterministic and does not require messages.
In particular, if the target action is time-independent (at = a
 8 t), the contract
c = v 1 (g0 (a) r +K) (8)
is optimal, where r =
PT
t=1 rt is the total signal.
Proof. (Heuristic). The Appendix presents a rigorous proof that rules out stochastic
contracts and messages, and does not assume that the contract is di¤erentiable. Here,
we give a heuristic proof by induction on T that conveys the essence of the result for
deterministic message-free contracts, using rst-order conditions and assuming at < a.
We commence with T = 1. Since 1 is known, we can remove the expectations operator
from the incentive compatibility condition (6). Since u is an increasing function, it also
drops out to yield:
a1 2 argmax
a1
v (c (a1 + 1))  g (a1) : (9)
The rst-order condition is:
v0 (c (a1 + 1)) c
0(a1 + 1)  g0 (a1) = 0:
Therefore, for all r1,
v0 (c (r1)) c0 (r1) = g0 (a1) ;
which integrates over 1 to
v (c (r1)) = g
0 (a1) r1 +K (10)
for some constant K. Contract (10) must hold for all r1 that occurs with non-zero proba-
bility, i.e. for r1 2

a1 + 1; a

1 + 1

.
Proceeding by induction, we now show that, if the result holds for T , it also holds for
T +1. Let V (r1; :::; rT+1)  v (c (r1; :::; rT+1)) denote the indirect felicity function, i.e. the
contract in terms of felicity rather than cash. At t = T + 1, the incentive compatibility
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condition is:
aT+1 2 argmax
aT+1
V (r1; :::; rT ; T+1 + aT+1)  g (aT+1) 
TX
t=1
g (at ) : (11)
Applying the result for T = 1, to induce aT+1 at T + 1, the contract must be of the form:
V (r1; :::; rT ; rT+1) = g
0  aT+1 rT+1 + k (r1; :::; rT ) ; (12)
where the integration constantnow depends on the past signals, i.e. k (r1; :::; rT ). In
turn, k (r1; :::; rT ) must be chosen to implement a1; :::; a

T viewed from t = 0, when the
agents utility is:
E
"
u
 
k (r1; :::; rT ) + g
0  aT+1 rT+1   g  aT+1  TX
t=1
g (at)
!#
:
Dening bu (x) = E u  x+ g0  aT+1 rT+1   g  aT+1 ; (13)
the principals problem is to implement a1; :::; a

T with a contract k (r1; :::; rT ), given a
utility function
E
"bu k (r1; :::; rT )  TX
t=1
g (at)
!#
:
Applying the result for T , the contract must have the form k (r1; :::; rT ) =
PT
t=1 g
0 (at ) rt+
K for some constant K. Combining this with (10), an incentive compatible contract must
satisfy:
V (r1; :::; rT ; rT+1) =
T+1X
t=1
g0 (at ) rt +K: (14)
for (rt) that occurs with non-zero probability (i.e. (r1; :::; rT ) 2
TY
t=1

at + t; a

t + t

. The
associated pay is c = v 1
PT+1
t=1 g
0 (at ) rt +K

, as in (7). Conversely, any contract that
satises (14) is incentive compatible.
The main applications of Theorem 1 are likely to be for T = 1 or for a constant at ;
Section 3.2 derives conditions under which the maximum productive e¤ort level is optimal
for all t. In such cases, the contract is particularly simple and only depends on the total
signal, as shown in (8).
In addition to deriving the incentive scheme in closed form (for any T and (at )),
Theorem 1 also claries the parameters that do and do not matter for the contracts
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functional form. It depends only on the felicity function v and the cost of e¤ort g, i.e.
how the agent trades o¤ the benets of cash against the costs of providing e¤ort, and is
independent of the utility function u, the reservation utility u, and the distribution of the
noise . For brevity, we call such a contract detail-neutral.This term aims to highlight
that certain details of the contracting situation do not matter for the functional form (7);
it does not imply that the functional form is independent of all parameters. If v(c) = c
(the cost of e¤ort is pecuniary) as assumed by HM, the contract is linear regardless of
u, even though the cost function g (at) may be nonlinear. The linear contracts of HM
can thus be achieved in settings that do not require exponential utility, Gaussian noise or
continuous time.
The origins of the contracts tractability and detail-neutrality can be seen in the heuris-
tic proof. We rst consider T = 1. Since 1 is known, the expectations operator can be
removed from (6). u then drops out to yield (9): u is irrelevant because it only a¤ects the
magnitude of the increment in utility that results from choosing the correct a1 (i.e. the
a1 that solves (9)). This magnitude is irrelevant the only important property is that
it is always positive because u is monotonic. Regardless of the form that u takes, it is
maximized by maximizing its argument, i.e. solving (9).
Even though all noise is known when the agent takes his action, it is not automatically
irrelevant. First, since the agent does not know 1 when he signs the contract, he is subject
to risk and so the rst-best is not achieved. Second, the noise realization has the potential
to undo incentives. If there is a high 1, r1 and thus c will already be high, even if the
agent exerts low e¤ort. (A high reservation utility u has the same e¤ect). If the agent
exhibits diminishing marginal felicity (i.e. v is concave), he will have lower incentives
to exert e¤ort. The optimal contract must address this problem. It does so by being
convex, via the v 1 transformation: if noise is high, it gives a greater number of dollars
for exerting e¤ort ( @c
@r1
), to exactly o¤set the lower marginal felicity of each dollar (v0(c)).
Therefore, the marginal felicity from e¤ort remains v0(c) @c
@r1
= g0 (a1), and incentives are
preserved regardless of u or . If the cost of e¤ort is pecuniary (v(c) = c), v 1(c) = c and
so no transformation is needed. Since both the costs and benets of e¤ort are in monetary
terms, high past noise diminishes them equally. Thus, incentives are unchanged even with
a linear contract.
We now move to the general case of T > 1. In all periods before the nal one,
the agent is now exposed to residual uncertainty, since he does not know future noise
realizations when he chooses at. Much like the e¤ect of a high current noise realization,
if the agent expects future noise to be high, his incentives to exert e¤ort will be reduced.
In some models, this would require the agent to integrate over future noise realizations
when choosing at. Here the unknown future noise outcomes do not matter, and this can be
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seen in the heuristic proof. Before T + 1, T+1 is unknown. However, (12) shows that the
component of the contract that solves the T +1 problem (g0
 
aT+1

rT+1) is independent of
that which solves the t = 1; :::; T problems (k (r1; :::; rT )). Hence, the unknown T+1 enters
additively and does not a¤ect the incentive constraints of the t = 1; :::; T problems.13 Our
timing assumption thus allows us to solve the multiperiod problem via backward induction,
reducing it to a succession of one-period problems, each of which can be solved separately.
It has little e¤ect on the economics of the situation since the agent continues to face
uncertainty in all periods except for the nal one, but instead is a technical device to
allow us to collapse the problems.
Even though we can consider each problem separately, the periods remain interdepen-
dent. Much like the current noise realization, past outcomes may a¤ect the current e¤ort
choice. The Mirrlees (1974) contract punishes the agent if nal output is below a certain
threshold. Therefore, if the agent can observe past outcomes, he will shirk if interim
output is high. This complexity distinguishes our multiperiod model from a static multi-
action model, where the agent chooses T actions simultaneously. As in HM, and unlike
in a multi-action model, here the agent observes past outcomes when taking his current
action, and can vary his action in response. HM assume exponential utility to remove such
wealth e¤ects and remove the intertemporal link between periods. We instead ensure
that past outcomes do not distort incentives via the v 1 transformation described above,
and so do not require exponential utility.
We achieve simple contracts in other settings than HM due to a di¤erent modeling
framework. In HM, as in Grossman and Hart (1983), e¤ort is modeled as the selection
of a probability distribution over states of nature. Since e¤ort only has a probabilistic
e¤ect on outcomes, the model already features uncertainty and so there is no need to
introduce additional noise noise dependence is not an issue. However, this formulation
of e¤ort requires exponential utility to remove wealth e¤ects and achieve independence
of the reservation wage.14 By modeling e¤ort as an increment to the signal (equation
(1)), we achieve independence of u. This modeling choice requires the specication of
a noise process, else the e¤ort decision would become contractible. We then achieve
13This can be most clearly seen in the denition of the new utility function (13), which absorbsthe
T + 1 period problem.
14Specically, the agents objective function is
P
j u (cj   g(p; j)) pj where the summation is across
states j , and pj is the probability of each state chosen by the agent. If the reservation wage is reduced by
w, does the new incentive scheme simply subtract w from each cj? The objective function would becomeP
j u (v(cj)  w   c(p; j)) pj . Since pj is outside the u() function, u() does not automatically drop out.
Only if utility is exponential does the objective function simplify to  u( w)Pj u (v(cj)  c(p; j)) pj ,
and so incentives are preserved by subtracting w from each payment cj , i.e. the participation constraint
can be met without a¤ecting the incentive constraints. This property will not hold with non-exponential
utility.
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tractability by our timing assumption, which allows us to solve the multiperiod problem by
backward induction, and the v 1 transformation ensures incentives are preserved regardless
of past noise or the reservation wage. In sum, the combination of the e¤ort and timing
specications achieves tractability and independence of both utility u and noise .
The Appendix proves that, even though the agent privately observes t, there is no
need for him to communicate it to the principal. Since at is implemented for all t,
there is a one-to-one correspondence between rt and t on the equilibrium path. The
principal can thus infer t from rt, rendering messages redundant. The Appendix also
shows that we can rule out randomized contracts. There are two e¤ects of randomization.
First, it leads to ine¢ cient risk-sharing, for any concave u. Second, it alters the marginal
cost of e¤ort. If the utility function exhibits NIARA, this cost weakly increases with
randomization. Thus, both e¤ects of randomization are undesirable, and deterministic
contracts are unambiguously optimal.15 The proof makes use of the independence of
noises and the log-concavity of 2; :::; T . Note that while these assumptions, combined
with the NIARA utility function, are su¢ cient to rule out randomized contracts, they may
not be necessary. In future research, it would be interesting to explore whether randomized
contracts can be ruled out in broader settings.16
In addition to allowing for stochastic contracts, the above analysis also allows for at = a
for some t. When at = a, the incentive compatibility constraint is an inequality. Therefore,
the contract in (7) only provides a lower bound on the contract slope that implements at .
A sharper-than-necessary contract has a similar e¤ect to a stochastic contract, since it
subjects the agent to additional risk. Again, the combination of NIARA and independent
and log-concave noises is su¢ cient rule out such contracts. In sum, if the analysis allows
for randomized contracts and at = a, there are several incentive compatible contracts and
the above three assumptions are su¢ cient to show that the contract in (7) is cheaper than
stochastic contracts or contracts with a greater slope.
If the analysis is restricted to deterministic contracts and at < a 8 t, the contract in
(7) is the only incentive-compatible contract (for the signal values realized on the equi-
librium path). We can thus drop the assumptions of NIARA utility and log-concave and
independent noises. This result is stated in Proposition 1 below.
Proposition 1 (Optimal deterministic contract, at < a 8 t). Consider only deterministic
contracts and at < a 8 t. Drop the assumptions of NIARA utility, independent noises, and
15This result builds on Arnott and Stiglitz (1988), who derived conditions under which randomization
is suboptimal in a di¤erent setting of insurance.
16For instance, consider the case T = 2. We only require that bu (x) as dened in (40) exhibits NIARA.
The concavity of 2 is su¢ cient, but unnecessary for this. Separately, if NIARA is violated, the marginal
cost of e¤ort falls with randomization. However, this e¤ect may be outweighed by the ine¢ cient risk-
sharing, so randomized contracts may still be dominated.
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log-concave noises for 2; :::; T ; assume only that for all t, t has open interval support
conditional on 1:::; t 1. Any incentive-compatible contract takes the form
c = v 1
 
TX
t=1
g0 (at ) rt +K
!
(15)
for some K, and for (rt)tT in the interior of the support of the realized values of the
signal on the equilibrium path, (at + t)tT . Conversely, any contract that satises (15)
for all rt is incentive-compatible. The optimal contract has form (15), where K makes the
agents participation constraint bind.
Proof. See Appendix.
We close this section by considering two specic applications of Theorem 1 to executive
compensation, to highlight the implications that stem from a tractable contract structure.
While contract (7) can be implemented for any informative signal r, the rms equity return
is the natural choice of r for CEOs, since they are contracted to maximize shareholder
value. When the cost of e¤ort is pecuniary (v (c) = c), Theorem 1 implies that the CEOs
dollar pay c is linear in the rms return r. Hence, the relevant incentives measure is the
dollar change in CEO pay for a given percentage change in rm value (i.e. dollar-percent
incentives), as advocated by Hall and Liebman (1998).
Another common specication is v(c) = ln c, in which case the CEOs utility function
(2) now becomes, up to a monotonic (logarithmic) transformation:
E

U
 
ce g(a)
  U; (16)
where u (x)  U (ex) and U  lnu is the CEOs reservation utility. Utility is now multi-
plicative in e¤ort and consumption salary; Edmans, Gabaix and Landier (2008) show that
multiplicative preferences are necessary to generate empirically consistent predictions for
the scaling of various measures of CEO incentives with rm size. Note that we retain the
general utility function U().
Let r denote the rms log return and R = er denote its gross return. Applying
Theorem 1 with T = 1 for simplicity, the optimal contract becomes
ln c = g0(a)r +K: (17)
The optimal contract is independent of the utility function U . It prescribes the per-
centage change in CEO pay for a percentage change in rm value, i.e. percent-percent
incentives. Murphy (1999) advocated this elasticity measure over alternative incentive
measures (such as dollar-percent incentives) on two empirical grounds: it is invariant
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to rm size, and rm returns have much greater explanatory power for percentage than
dollar changes in pay. However, he notes that elasticities have no corresponding agency-
theoretic interpretation.The above analysis shows that elasticities are the theoretically
justied measure under multiplicative preferences, regardless of the CEOs utility function.
This result extends Edmans, Gabaix and Landier (2008) who advocated percent-percent
incentives in a risk-neutral model.
2.2 Continuous Time
This section shows that the contract has the same detail-neutral functional form in contin-
uous time, where actions and noise occur simultaneously. The consistency of the incentive
scheme suggests that, if the underlying reality is continuous time, it is best mimicked in
discrete time by modeling noise before the e¤ort decision in each period.
At every instant t, the agent takes action at and the principal observes signal rt, where
rt =
Z t
0
asds+ t; (18)
t =
R t
0
sdZs +
R t
0
sds, Zt is a standard Brownian motion, and t > 0 and t are
deterministic. The agents utility function is:
E

u

v (c) 
Z T
0
g (at) dt

: (19)
The principal observes the path of (rt)t2[0;T ] and wishes to implement a deterministic
action (at )t2[0;T ] at each instant. She solves Program 1 with utility function (19). The
optimal contract is of the same detail-neutral form as Theorem 1.
Theorem 2 (Optimal contract, continuous time). The following contract is optimal. The
agent is paid
c = v 1
Z T
0
g0 (at ) drt +K

, (20)
whereK is a constant that makes the participation constraint bind (E
"
u
 R T
0
g0 (at ) drt +K
  R T
0
g (at ) dt
!#
=
u).
In particular, if the target action is time-independent (at = a
 8 t), the contract
c = v 1 (g0 (a) rT +K) (21)
is optimal.
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Proof. See Appendix.
To highlight the link with the discrete time case, consider the model of Section 2.1 and
dene rT =
PT
t=1 rt =
PT
t=1 at +
PT
t=1 t. Taking the continuous time limit of Theorem 1
gives Theorem 2.
2.3 Discussion: What is Necessary for Tractable, Detail-Neutral
Contracts?
This section has extended the tractable contracts of HM to settings that do not require
exponential utility, continuous time or Gaussian noise. However, the framework considered
thus far has still imposed a number of restrictions, such as a risk-neutral principal, a linear
signal, log-concave noises and a NIARA utility function. We now discuss the features that
are essential for our contract structure, inessential features that we have already relaxed
in extensions to the core model, and additional assumptions which may be relaxable in
future research.
1. Timing of noise. We require that t is observed before at in each period. Without
this assumption, the contract will depend on the utility function and the noise dis-
tribution. (The dependence on the noise distribution has been previously shown by
Holmstrom (1979) and Grossman and Hart (1983), who assumed u (x) = x.) The
Online Appendix shows that, even if at precedes t, contract (7) still implements
(at )t=1;::;T , although we can no longer show that it is optimal.
2. Risk-neutral principal. The proof of Theorem 1 extends the model to the case of a
risk-averse principal. If the principal wishes to minimize E [w (c)] (where w is an in-
creasing function) rather than E [c], then contract (7) is optimal if u (v (w 1 ()) Pt g (at ))
is concave. This holds if, loosely speaking, the principal is not too risk-averse.
3. NIARA utility, independent and log-concave noise. Proposition 1 states that, if at <
a 8 t and deterministic contracts are assumed, (7) is the only incentive-compatible
contract. Therefore, these assumptions are not required.
4. Unidimensional noise and action. The Online Appendix shows that our model is
readily extendable to settings where the action a and the noise  are multidimen-
sional. A close analog to our result obtains.
5. Linear signal. The linearity of the signal, rt = at + t, is not essential. Remark 1 in
Section 3.1 later shows that with general signals rt = R (at; t), the optimal contract
remains detail-neutral.
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6. Timing of consumption. The current setup assumes that the agent only consumes
at the end of period T . In ongoing work, we are developing the analog of Theorem 1
for repeated settings where the agent consumes in multiple periods. The key results
remain robust to this extension.
7. Renegotiation. Since the target e¤ort path is xed, there is no scope for renegotiation
when the agent observes the noise. In Section 3.1, the optimal action may depend
on . Since the optimal contract species an action for every realization of , again
there is no incentive to renegotiate.
3 The Optimal E¤ort Level
We have thus far assumed that the principal wishes to implement an exogenous path
of e¤ort levels (at ). In Section 3.1 we allow the target e¤ort level to depend on the
noise. Section 3.2 shows that, in a broad class of situations, the principal will wish to
implement the maximum productive e¤ort level for all noise realizations (the maximum
e¤ort principle).
3.1 Contingent Target Actions
Let At (t) denote the action function, which denes the target action for each noise
realization. (Thus far, we have assumed At (t) = at , independent of t.) Since it is
possible that di¤erent noises t could lead to the same observed signal rt = At (t)+t, the
analysis must consider revelation mechanisms; indeed, we nd that the optimal contract
now involves messages. If the agent announces noises b1; :::; bT , he is paid c = C (b1; :::; bT )
if the observed signals are A1 (b1)+b1; :::; AT (bT )+bT , and a very low amount c otherwise.
As in the core model, we assume that At (t) > a 8 t, else a at contract would
be optimal for some noise realizations. We make three additional technical assumptions:
the action space A is open, At (t) is bounded within any compact subinterval of , and
At (t) is almost everywhere continuous. The nal assumption still allows for a countable
number of jumps in At (t). Given the complexity and length of the proof that randomized
contracts are inferior in Theorem 1, we now restrict the analysis to deterministic contracts
and assume At (t) < a. We conjecture that the same arguments in that proof continue to
apply with a noise-dependent target action.
The optimal contract induces both the target e¤ort level (at = At (t)) and truth-telling
(bt = t). It is given by the next Theorem:
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Theorem 3 (Optimal contract, noise-dependent action). The following contract is op-
timal. For each t, after noise t is realized, the agent communicates a value bt to the
principal. If the subsequent signal is not At (bt) + bt in each period, he is paid a very low
amount c. Otherwise he is paid C (b1; :::; bT ), where
C (1; :::; T ) = v
 1
 
TX
t=1
g (At (t)) +
TX
t=1
Z t

g0 (At (x)) dx+K
!
; (22)
 is an arbitrary constant, and K is a constant that makes the participation constraint
bind (E
h
u
PT
t=1
R t
 g
0 (At (x)) dx+K
i
= u.)
Proof. (Heuristic). The Appendix presents a rigorous proof that does not assume dif-
ferentiability of V and A. Here, we give a heuristic proof that conveys the essence of the
result using rst-order conditions. We set T = 1 and drop the time subscript.
Instead of reporting , the agent could report b 6= , in which case he receives c
unless r = A (b) + b. Therefore, he must take action a such that  + a = b + A (b), i.e.
a = A (b) + b   . In this case, his utility is V (b)   g (A (b) + b   ). The truth-telling
constraint is thus:
 2 argmaxb V (b)  g (A (b) + b   ) ;
with rst-order condition
V 0 () = g0 (A ())A0 () + g0 (A ()) :
Integrating over  gives the indirect felicity function
V () = g (A ()) +
Z 

g0 (A (x)) dx+K
for constants  and K. The associated pay is given by (22).
The functional form of the contract in Theorem 3 does not depend on u () nor on the
distribution of .17 However, it is somewhat more complex than the contracts in Section 2,
as it involves calculating an integral. In the particular case where A () = a 8 , Theorem
3 reduces to Theorem 1.
Remark 1 (Extension of Theorem 3 to general signals). Suppose the signal is not rt =
at + t but a general function rt = R (at; t), where R is di¤erentiable and has positive
derivatives in both arguments. The same analysis as in Theorem 3 derives the following
17Even though (22) features an integral over the support of , it does not involve the distribution of .
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contract as optimal:
C (1; :::; T ) = v
 1
 
TX
t=1
g (At ()) +
Z t

g0 (At (x))
R2 (At (x) ; x)
R1 (At (x) ; x)
dx+K
!
; (23)
where  is an arbitrary constant and K is a constant that makes the participation con-
straint bind.
The heuristic proof is as follows (setting T = 1 and dropping the time subscript). If
 is observed and the agent reports b 6= , he has to take action a such that R (a; ) =
R (A (b) ; b). Taking the derivative at b =  yields R1@a=@b = R1A0 () + R2. The
agent solves maxb V (b) g (a (b)), with rst-order condition V 0 () g0 (A ()) @a=@b = 0.
Substituting for @a=@b from above and integrating over  yields (23).
3.2 Maximum E¤ort Principle for Large Firms
We now consider the optimal action function A (), specializing to T = 1 for simplicity.
The principal chooses A () to maximize
S E

b
 
min
 
A (e) ; a ; e  E v 1 (V (e)) : (24)
The second term is the expected cost of compensation. It captures both the direct
disutility from exerting e¤ort A() and the risk imposed by the incentive contract required
to implement A (). The rst term captures the productivity of e¤ort, which is increasing
in S, the baseline value of the output under the agents control. For example, if the agent
is a CEO, S is rm size; if he is a divisional manager, S is the size of his division. We will
refer to S as rm size for brevity. E¤ort increases rm size to S E

b
 
min
 
A (e) ; a ; e
where b() is the productivity function of e¤ort and a < a is the maximum productive
e¤ort level. Dening a = min
 
A (e) ; a, we assume that b (a; ) is di¤erentiable with
respect to a, with infa; @b (a; ) =@a > 0. For example, if e¤ort has a linear e¤ect on the
rms log return, b (a; ) = ea+ and so e¤ort a¤ects rm value multiplicatively.
The min
 
A (e) ; a function conveys the fact that, while the action space may be un-
bounded (a may be innite), there is a limit to the number of productive activities the
agent can undertake to benet the principal. For example, if the agent is a CEO, there is
a nite number of positive-NPV projects available; under the interpretation of a as rent
extraction, a reects zero stealing. For all agents, there is a limit to the number of hours a
day they can work while remaining productive. In addition to being economically realistic,
this assumption is useful technically as it prevents the optimal action from being innite.
Actions a > a do not benet the principal, but improve the signal: one interpretation is
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manipulation (see Appendix C for further details). Clearly, the principal will never wish
to implement a > a.
The next Theorem gives conditions under which maximum productive e¤ort is opti-
mal.18
Theorem 4 (Optimality of maximum productive e¤ort). Assume that sup(a;a) g
00 and
supx F (x) =f (x) are nite, where f is the probability density function of , and F is the
complementary cumulative distribution (i.e. F (x) = Pr (  x)). Dene
 =
241 + u0 ()
u0 ()
0@ sup
(a;a)
g00
1Asup F
f

+ g0
 
a
35  v 10   + g  a ; (25)
where
  u 1 (u)       g0  a and   u 1 (u) +      g0  a :
When baseline rm size S is above a threshold size S = = infa; @b@a (a; ), imple-
menting A () = a is optimal for all . Hence, allowing for noise-dependent actions, the
optimal unrestricted contract is c = v 1
 
g0
 
a

r +K

, where K is a constant that makes
the agents participation constraint bind.
Proof. See Appendix.
The costs of e¤ort are the disutility imposed on the CEO plus the risk imposed by
incentives (summarized by ) and thus of similar order of magnitude to CEO pay. The
benets of e¤ort are enhanced rm value and thus of similar order of magnitude to rm
size. The productivity of e¤ort also depends on the noise outcome, via the function b (a; ).
If the rm is su¢ ciently large (S > S), the benets of e¤ort outweigh the costs for all noise
outcomes, and so dominate the trade-o¤. Therefore, maximum productive e¤ort is optimal
(A () = a 8 .) A simple numerical example illustrates. Consider a rm with a $20b
market value and, to be conservative, assume that maximum CEO e¤ort increases rm
value by only 1%. Then, maximum e¤ort creates $200m of value, which vastly outweighs
the CEOs salary. Even if it is necessary to double the CEOs salary to compensate him
for the costs of e¤ort, the benets of e¤ort are much greater than the costs and so the rm
wishes to implement maximum e¤ort.
Combined with the results of Section 2, the optimal contract is detail-neutral in two
dimensions both the target e¤ort level and the e¢ cient implementation of this target.
18Theorem 4 states the assumption that supx F (x) =f (x) is nite. A su¢ cient condition for this is to
have f continuous, f(x) > 0 8 x 2 [; ), and f monotonic in a left neighborhood of . This condition is
satised for many usual distributions.
21
The irrelevance of risk is consistent with the empirical evidence surveyed by Prendergast
(2002): a number of studies nd that incentives are independent of risk, with the remainder
equally divided between nding positive and negative correlations.
The comparative statics on the threshold rm size S are intuitive. First, S is increas-
ing in noise dispersion, because the rm must be large enough for maximum e¤ort to be
optimal for all noise realizations. Indeed, a rise in     increases , lowers , and raises
sup F
f
. (For example, if the noise is uniformly distributed, then sup F
f
=   ). Second, it
is increasing in the agents risk aversion and thus the risk imposed by incentives. For low
noises, where the agents utility is close to u, u
0()
u0()   1 is proportional to the agents ab-
solute risk aversion. Third, it is increasing in the disutility of e¤ort, and thus the marginal
cost of e¤ort g0
 
a

and the convexity of the cost function sup g00. Fourth, it is decreasing
in the marginal benet of e¤ort (infa; @b@a (a; )).
We conjecture that a maximum e¤ort principleholds under more general conditions
than those considered above. For instance, it likely continues to hold if the principals ob-
jective function is S E [b (A (e) ; e)] E [v 1 (V (e))], and the action space is bounded above
by a i.e. a (the maximum feasible e¤ort level) equals a (the maximum productive e¤ort
level). This slight variant is economically very similar, since the principal never wishes
to implement A () > a in our setting, but substantially more complicated mathemati-
cally, because the agents action space now has boundaries and so the incentive constraints
become inequalities. We leave the extension of this principle to future research.
3.3 Optimal E¤ort for Small Firms and Linear Cost of E¤ort
While Theorem 4 shows that A() = a is optimal when S > S, we now show that A()
can be exactly derived even if S  S, if the cost function is linear i.e. g (a) = a, where
 > 0.19
Proposition 2 (Optimal contract with linear cost of e¤ort). Let g (a) = a, where  > 0 .
The following contract is optimal:
c = v 1 (r +K) ; (26)
where K is a constant that makes the participation constraint bind (E [u ( +K)] = u).
For each , the optimal e¤ort A () is determined by the following pointwise maximization:
A () 2 argmax
aa
Sb (a; )  v 1 ( (a+ ) +K) : (27)
19Note that the linearity of g(a) is still compatible with u (v (c)  g (a)) being strictly concave in (c; a).
Also, by a simple change of notation, the results extend to an a¢ ne rather than linear g (a).
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When the agent is indi¤erent between an action a and A (), we assume that he chooses
action A () :
Proof. From Theorem 3, if the agent announces , he should receive a felicity of V () =
g (A ())+
R 
 dx+K =  (A () + )+K. Since r = A ()+ on the equilibrium path, a
contract c = v 1 (r +K) will implement A (). To nd the optimal action, the principals
problem is:
max
A()
E

Sb
 
min
 
A () ; a

; 
  E v 1 ( (A () + ) +K)
which is solved by pointwise maximization, as in (27).
The main advantage of the above contract is that it can be exactly solved regardless
of S and so it is applicable even for small rms (or rank-and-le employees who a¤ect a
small output). For instance, consider a benet function b (a; ) = b0 + ae, where b0 > 0,
so that the marginal productivity of e¤ort is increasing in the noise, and utility function
u (ln c  a) with  2 (0; 1). Then, the solution of (27) is:
A () = min

1  

 + lnS  K   ln ; a

:
The optimal e¤ort level increases linearly with the noise, until it reaches a. The e¤ort
level is also weakly increasing in rm size.
The main disadvantage is that, with a linear rather than strictly convex cost function,
the agent is indi¤erent between all actions. His decision problem is maxa v (c (r))  g (a),
i.e. maxa  ( + a) + K   a, which is independent of a and thus has a continuum of
solutions. Proposition 2 therefore assumes that indeterminacies are resolved by the agent
following the principals recommended action, A ().
4 Conclusion
This paper has identied and analyzed a class of situations in which the optimal contract
is both tractable and detail-neutral. The contract can be solved in closed form and its
slope is independent of the noise distribution and reservation utility; it is only determined
by how the agent trades o¤ the benets of cash against the cost of e¤ort. Furthermore,
when the cost of e¤ort can be expressed in nancial terms, the optimal contract is linear,
regardless of the utility function.
Holding the target e¤ort level constant, detail-neutrality obtains in a multi-period
discrete time model, where noise precedes e¤ort in each period. The optimal contract is
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also the same in continuous time, where noise and actions occur simultaneously. Hence, if
the underlying reality is continuous time, it is best mimicked in discrete time under our
timing assumption. If the rm is su¢ ciently large, the target e¤ort level is itself detail-
neutral: the maximum e¤ort level is optimal for a wide range of cost and e¤ort functions
and noise distributions. Since the benets of e¤ort are a function of total output, trade-o¤
concerns disappear in a large rm, so maximum e¤ort is e¢ cient.
The model thus extends the tractable contracts of HM to settings that do not require
exponential utility, continuous time or Gaussian noise. Moreover, it demonstrates which
details of the contracting environment do and do not matter for the optimal incentive
scheme. It can therefore rationalize why real-life contracts typically do not depend on as
many specic details of the setting as existing literature might suggest simply put, these
details do not matter.
Our paper suggests several avenues for future research. The HM framework has proven
valuable in many areas of applied contract theory owing to its tractability; however, some
researchers have used the HM result in settings where the assumptions are not satised
(see the critique of Hemmer (2004)). While we considered the specic application of execu-
tive compensation, other possibilities include bank regulation, team production, insurance
or taxation. In particular, our contracts are valid in situations where time is discrete,
utility cannot be modeled as exponential (e.g. in calibrated models where it is necessary
to capture decreasing absolute risk aversion), or noise is not Gaussian (e.g. is bounded).
In ongoing work, we are extending detail-neutral contracts to a dynamic setting where the
agent consumes in each period, can privately save, and may smooth earnings intertem-
porally. In addition, while our model has relaxed a number of assumptions required for
tractability, it continues to impose a number of restrictions. These are mostly technical
rather than economic. For example, we feature a continuum of actions rather than a
discrete set; our multiperiod model assumes independent noises with log-concave density
functions; and our extension to noise-dependent target actions assumes an open action
space and a maximum productive e¤ort level. Some of these assumptions may not be
valid in certain situations, limiting the applicability of our framework. Whether our setup
can be further generalized is an open question for future research.
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a E¤ort (also referred to as action)
a Maximum e¤ort
a Maximum productive e¤ort
a Target e¤ort
b Benet function for e¤ort, dened over a
c Cash compensation
f Density of the noise distribution
g Cost of e¤ort, dened over a
r Signal (or return), typically r = a+ 
u Agents utility function, dened over v (c)  g (a)
u Agents reservation utility
v Agents felicity function, dened over c
 Noise
A Action function, dened over 
C Expected cost of contract
F Complementary cumulative distribution function for noise
M Message sent by agent to the principal
S Baseline size of output under agents control
T Number of periods
V Felicity provided by contract
Table 1: Key Variables in the Model.
A Mathematical Preliminaries
This section derives some mathematical results that we use for the main proofs.
A.1 Dispersion of Random Variables
We repeatedly use the dispersive order for random variables to show that incentive
compatibility constraints bind. Shaked and Shanthikumar (2007, section 3.B) provide
an excellent summary of known facts about this concept. This section provides a self-
contained guide of the relevant results for our paper, as well as proving some new results.
We commence by dening the notion of relative dispersion. Let X and Y denote two
random variables with cumulative distribution functions F and G and corresponding right
continuous inverses F 1 and G 1. X is said to be less dispersed than Y if and only if
F 1 () F 1 ()  G 1 () G 1 () whenever 0 <    < 1. This concept is location-
free: X is less dispersed than Y if and only if it is less dispersed than Y + z, for any real
constant z.
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A basic property is the following result (Shaked and Shanthikumar (2007), p.151):
Lemma 1 Let X be a random variable and f , h be functions such that 0  f (y) f (x) 
h (y)  h (x) whenever x  y. Then f (X) is less dispersed than h (X).
This result is intuitive: h magnies di¤erences to a greater extent than f , leading to
more dispersion. We will also use the next two comparison lemmas.
Lemma 2 Assume that X is less dispersed than Y and let f denote a weakly increas-
ing function, h a weakly increasing concave function, and  a weakly increasing convex
function. Then:
E [f (X)]  E [f (Y )]) E [h (f (X))]  E [h (f (Y ))]
E [f (X)]  E [f (Y )]) E [ (f (X))]  E [ (f (Y ))] :
Proof. The rst statement comes directly from Shaked and Shanthikumar (2007), Theo-
rem 3.B.2, which itself is taken from Landsberger and Meilijson (1994). The second state-
ment is derived from the rst, applied to bX =  X, bY =  Y , bf (x) =  f ( x), h (x) =
  ( x). It can be veried directly (or via consulting Shaked and Shanthikumar (2007),
Theorem 3.B.6) that bX is less dispersed than bY . In addition, E h bf  bXi  E h bf bY i.
Thus, E
h
h
 bf  bXi  E hh bf bY i. Substituting h bf  bX =   (f (X)) yields
E [  (f (X))]  E [  (f (Y ))].
Lemma 2 is intuitive: if E [f (X)]  E [f (Y )], applying a concave function h should
maintain the inequality. Conversely, if E [f (X)]  E [f (Y )], applying a convex function
 should maintain the inequality. In addition, if E [X] = E [Y ], Lemma 2 implies that X
second-order stochastically dominates Y . Hence, it is a stronger concept than second-order
stochastic dominance.
Lemma 2 allows us to prove Lemma 3 below, which states that the NIARA property
of a utility function is preserved by adding a log-concave random variable to its argument.
Lemma 3 Let u denote a utility function with NIARA and Y a random variable with
a log-concave distribution. Then, the utility function bu dened by bu (x)  E [u (x+ Y )]
exhibits NIARA.
Proof. Consider two constants a < b and a lottery Z independent from Y . Let Ca and
Cb be the certainty equivalents of Z with respect to utility function bu and evaluated at
points a and b respectively, i.e. dened by
bu (a+ Ca) = E [u (a+ Z)] ; bu (b+ Cb) = E [u (b+ Z)] :
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bu exhibits NIARA if and only if Ca  Cb, i.e. the certainty equivalent increases with
wealth. To prove that Ca  Cb, we make three observations. First, since u exhibits
NIARA, there exists an increasing concave function h such that u (a+ x) = h (u (b+ x))
for all x. Second, because Y is log-concave, Y + Cb is less dispersed than Y + Z by
Theorem 3.B.7 of Shaked and Shanthikumar (2007). Third, by denition of Cb and the
independence of Y and Z, we have E [u (b+ Y + Cb)] = E [u (b+ Y + Z)]. Hence, we can
apply Lemma 2, which yields E [h (u (b+ Y + Cb))]  E [h (u (b+ Y + Z))], i.e.
E [u (a+ Y + Cb)]  E [u (a+ Y + Z)] = E [u (a+ Y + Ca)] by denition of Ca:
Thus we have Cb  Ca as required.
A.2 Subderivatives
Since we cannot assume that the optimal contract is di¤erentiable, we use the notion of
subderivatives to allow for quasi rst-order conditions in all cases.
Denition 1 For a point x and function f dened in a left neighborhood of x, we dene
the subderivative of f at x as:
d
dx 
f  f 0  (x)  lim inf
y"x
f (x)  f (y)
x  y
This notion will prove useful since f 0  (x) is well-dened for all functions f (with perhaps
innite values). We take limits from below,as we will often apply the subderivative at
the maximum feasible e¤ort level a. If f is left-di¤erentiable at x, then f 0  (x) = f
0 (x).
We use the following Lemma to allow us to integrate inequalities with subderivatives.
All the Lemmas in this subsection are proven in the Online Appendix.
Lemma 4 Assume that, over an interval I: (i) f 0  (x)  j (x) 8 x, for an continuous
function j (x) and (ii) there is a C1 function h such that f + h is nondecreasing. Then,
for two points a  b in I, f (b)  f (a)  R b
a
j (x) dx.
Condition (ii) prevents f (x) from exhibiting discontinuous downwards jumps, which
would prevent integration.20
The following Lemma is the chain rule for subderivatives.
20For example, f (x) = 1 fx  0g satises condition (i) as f 0  (x) = 0 8 x, but violates both condition
(ii) and the conclusion of the Lemma, as f ( 1) > f (1).
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Lemma 5 Let x be a real number and f be a function dened in a left neighborhood of x.
Suppose that function h is di¤erentiable at f (x), with h0 (f (x)) > 0. Then, (h  f)0  (x) =
h0 (f (x)) f 0  (x).
In general, subderivatives typically follow the usual rules of calculus, with inequalities
instead of equalities. One example is below.
Lemma 6 Let x be a real number and f , h be functions dened in a left neighborhood of
x. Then (f + h)0  (x)  f 0  (x)+h0  (x). When h is di¤erentiable at x, then (f + h)0  (x) =
f 0  (x) + h
0 (x).
B Detailed Proofs
Throughout these proofs, we use tildes to denote random variables. For example, e is the
noise viewed as a random variable and  is a particular realization of that noise. E [f (e)]
denotes the expectation over all realizations of e and E h ef (e)i denotes the expectation
over all realizations of both x and a stochastic function ef .
Proof of Theorem 1
Roadmap. We divide the proof in three parts. The rst part shows that messages are
redundant, so that we can restrict the analysis to contracts without messages. This part
of the proof is standard and can be skipped at a rst reading. The second part proves the
theorem considering only deterministic contracts and assuming that at < a 8 t. This case
requires weaker assumptions (see Proposition 1). The third part, which is signicantly
more complex, rules out randomized contracts and allows for the target e¤ort to be the
maximum a. Both these extensions require the concepts of subderivatives and dispersion
from Appendix A.
1). Redundancy of Messages
Let r denote the vector (r1; :::; rT ) and dene  and a analogously. Dene g (a) =
g (a1) + ::: + g (aT ). Let eVM (r;) = v (ec (r;)) denote the felicity given by a message-
dependent contract if the agent reports  and the realized signals are r. Under the rev-
elation principle, we can restrict the analysis to mechanisms that induce the agent to
truthfully report the noise . The incentive compatibility (IC) constraint is that the agent
exerts e¤ort a and reports b = :
8;8b;8a; E hueVM ( + a; b)  g (a)i  E hueVM ( + a;)  g (a)i : (28)
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The principals problem is to minimize expected pay E
h
v 1
eVM (e + a; e)i, subject
to the IC constraint (28), and the agents individual rationality (IR) constraint
E
h
u
eVM (e + a; e)  g (a)i  u: (29)
Since r = r  a+ on the equilibrium path, the message-dependent contract is equiv-
alent to eVM (r; r  a). We consider replacing this with a new contract eV (r), which only
depends on the realized signal and not on any messages, and yields the same felicity as
the corresponding message-dependent contract. Thus, the felicity it gives is dened by:
eV (r) = eVM (r; r  a) : (30)
The IC and IR constraints for the new contract are given by:
8;8a; E
h
u
eV (r)  g (a)i  E hueV (r)  g (a)i ; (31)
E
h
u
eV (r)  g (a)i  u: (32)
If the agent reports b 6= , he must take action a such that +a =b+a. Substitutingb = +a  a into (28) and (29) indeed yields (31) and (32) above. Thus, the IC and
IR constraints of the new contract are satised. Moreover, the new contract costs exactly
the same as the old contract, since it yields the same felicity by (30). Hence, the new
contract eV (r) induces incentive compatibility and participation at the same cost as the
initial contract eVM (r;) with messages, and so messages are not useful. The intuition is
that a is always exerted, so the principal can already infer  from the signal r without
requiring messages.
2). Deterministic Contracts, in the case at < a 8 t
We will prove the Theorem by induction on T .
2a). Case T = 1. Dropping the time subscript for brevity, the incentive compatibility
(IC) constraint is:
8;8a : V ( + a)  g (a)  V ( + a)  g (a)
Dening r =  + a and r0 =  + a, we have a = a + r0   r. The IC constraint can be
rewritten:
g (a)  g (a + r0   r)  V (r)  V (r0) :
Rewriting this inequality interchanging r and r0 yields g (a)   g (a + r   r0)  V (r0)  
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V (r), and so:
g (a)  g (a + r0   r)  V (r)  V (r0)  g (a + r   r0)  g (a) : (33)
We rst consider r > r0. Dividing through by r   r0 yields:
g (a)  g (a + r0   r)
r   r0 
V (r)  V (r0)
r   r0 
g (a + r   r0)  g (a)
r   r0 : (34)
Since a is in the interior of the action space A and the support of  is open, there exists r0
in the neighborhood of r. Taking the limit r0 " r, the rst and third terms of (34) converge
to g0 (a). Therefore, the left derivative V 0left (r) exists, and equals g
0 (a). Second, consider
r < r0. Dividing (33) through by r   r0, and taking the limit r0 # r shows that the right
derivative V 0right (r) exists, and equals g
0 (a). Therefore,
V 0 (r) = g0 (a) : (35)
Since r has interval support21, we can integrate to obtain, for some integration constant
K:
V (r) = g0 (a) r +K. (36)
2b). If the Theorem holds for T , it holds for T + 1. This part is as in the main text.
Note that the above proof (for deterministic contracts where at < a) does not require
log-concavity of t, nor that u satises NIARA. This is because the contract (7) is the only
incentive compatible contract. These assumptions are only required for the general proof,
where other contracts (e.g. randomized ones) are also incentive compatible, to show that
they are costlier than contract (7).
3). General Proof
We no longer restrict at to be in the interior of A, and allow for randomized contracts.
We wish to prove the following statement T by induction on integer T :
Statement T : Consider a utility function u with NIARA, independent random vari-
ables er1; :::; erT where er2; :::; erT are log-concave, and a sequence of nonnegative numbers
g0 (a1) ; :::; g
0 (aT ). Consider the set of (potentially randomized) contracts eV (r1; :::; rT ) such
21The model could be extended to allowing non-interval support: if the domain of r was a union of
disjoint intervals, we would have a di¤erent integration constant K for each interval.
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that (i) E
h
u
eV (er1; :::; erT )i  u; (ii) 8 t = 1:::T ,
d
d" 
E
h
u
eV (er1; :::; ert + "; :::; erT ) j er1; ::; ertij"=0  g0 (at ) E hu0 eV (er1; :::; ert; :::; erT ) j er1; ::; erti
(37)
and (iii) 8 t = 1:::; T , E
h
u
eV (er1; :::; ert; :::; erT ) j er1; ::; erti is nondecreasing in ert.
In this set, for any increasing and convex cost function , E [ (V (er1; :::; erT ))] is mini-
mized with contract: V 0 (r1; :::; rT ) =
PT
t=1 g
0 (at ) rt+K, where K is a constant that makes
the participation constraint (i) bind.
Condition (ii) is the local IC constraint, for deviations from below.
We rst consider the case of deterministic contracts, and then show that randomized
contracts are costlier. We use the notation Et [] = E [ j er1; :::; ert] to denote the expectation
based on time-t information.
3a). Deterministic Contracts
The key di¤erence from the proof in 2) is that we now must allow for at = a.
3ai). Proof of Statement T when T = 1.
(37) becomes d
d" u (V (r + "))j"=0  g0 (a1)u0 (V (r)). Applying Lemma 5 to h = u 1
yields:
V 0  (r)  g0 (a) : (38)
It is intuitive that (38) should bind, as this minimizes the variability in the agents
pay and thus constitutes e¢ cient risk-sharing. We now prove that this is indeed the case;
to simplify exposition, we normalize g (a) = 0 w.l.o.g.22 If constraint (38) binds, the
contract is V 0 (r) = g0 (a) r +K, where K satises E [u (g0 (a) r +K)] = u. We wish to
show that any other contract V (r) that satises (38) is weaklier costlier.
By assumption (iii) in Statement 1, V is nondecreasing. We can therefore apply
Lemma 4 to equation (38), where condition (ii) of the Lemma is satised by h (r)  0.
This implies that for r  r0, V (r0) V (r)  g0 (a) (r0   r) = V 0 (r0) V 0 (r). Thus, using
Lemma 1, V (er) is more dispersed than V 0 (er).
Since V must also satisfy the participation constraint, we have:
E [u (V (er))]  u = E u  V 0 (er) : (39)
Applying Lemma 2 to the convex function   u 1 and inequality (39), we have:
E

  u 1  u (V (er))  E   u 1  u  V 0 (er) ,
22Formally, this can be achieved by replacing the utility function u (x) by unew (x) = u (x  g (a)) and
the cost function g (a) by gnew (a) = g (a)  g (a), so that u (x  g (a)) = unew (x  gnew (a)).
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i.e. E [ (V (er))]  E [ (V 0 (er))]. The expected cost of V 0 is weakly less than for V .
Hence, the contract V 0 is cost-minimizing.
We note that this last part of the reasoning underpins item 2 in Section 2.3, the
extension to a risk-averse principal. Suppose that the principal wants to minimize E [w (c)],
where w is an increasing and concave function, rather than E [c]. Then, the above contract
is optimal if w  v 1  u 1 is convex, i.e. u  v w 1 is concave. This requires w to be not
too concave,i.e. the agent to be not too risk-averse.
Finally, we verify that the contract V 0 satises the global IC constraint. The agents
objective function becomes u (g0 (a) (a+ )  g (a)). Since g (a) is convex, the argument
of u () is concave. Hence, the rst-order condition gives the global optimum.
3aii). Proof that if Statement T holds for T , it holds for T + 1. We dene a new
utility function bu as follows:
bu (x) = E u  x+ g0  aT+1 erT+1 : (40)
Since erT+1 is log-concave, g0  aT+1 erT+1 is also log-concave. From Lemma 3, bu has the
same NIARA property as u.
For each er1; :::; erT , we dene k (er1; :::; erT ) as the solution to equation (41) below:
bu (k (er1; :::; erT )) = ET [u (V (er1; :::; erT+1))] : (41)
k represents the expected felicity from contract V based on all noise realizations up to and
including time T .
The goal is to show that any other contract V 6= V 0 is weakly costlier. To do so,
we wish to apply Statement T for utility function bu and contract k, The rst step is to
show that, if Conditions (i)-(iii) hold for utility function u and contract V at time T + 1,
they also hold for bu and k at time T , thus allowing us to apply the Statement for these
functions.
Taking expectations of (41) over er1; :::; erT yields:
E [bu (k (er1; :::; erT ))] = E [u (V (er1; :::; erT+1))]  u; (42)
where the inequality comes from Condition (i) for utility function u and contract V at
time T + 1. Hence, Condition (i) holds for utility function bu and contract k at time
t. In addition, it is immediate that E [bu (k (er1; :::; erT )) j er1; ::; ert] is nondecreasing in ert.
(Condition (iii)). We thus need to show that Condition (ii) is satised.
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Since equation (37) holds for t = T + 1, we have
d
d" 
u (V (er1; :::; erT ; erT+1 + "))  g0  aT+1u0 [V (er1; :::; erT+1)] :
Applying Lemma 5 with function u yields:
dV
drT+1 
(r1; :::; rT+1)  g0
 
aT+1

: (43)
Hence, using Lemma 1 and Lemma 4, we see that conditional on er1; :::; erT , V (er1; :::; erT+1)
is more dispersed than k (er1; :::; erT ) + g0  aT+1 erT+1.
Using (40), we can rewrite equation (41) as
ET

u
 
k (er1; :::; erT ) + g0  aT+1 erT+1 = ET [u (V (er1; :::; erT+1))] :
Since u exhibits NIARA,  u00 (x) =u0 (x) is nonincreasing in x. This is equivalent to u0u 1
being weakly convex. We can thus apply Lemma 2 to yield:
ET

u0  u 1  u (V (er1; :::; erT+1))  ET u0  u 1  u  k (er1; :::; erT ) + g0  aT+1 erT+1 , i.e.
ET [u
0 (V (er1; :::; erT+1))]  ET [bu0 (k (er1; :::; erT ))] : (44)
Applying denition (41) to the left-hand side of Condition (ii) for T + 1 yields, with
t = 1:::T ,
d
d" 
Et [bu (k (er1; :::; ert + "; :::; erT ))]j"=0  g0 (at ) E [u0 (V (er1; :::; ert; :::; erT+1)) j er1; ::; ert]
Taking expectations of equation (44) at time t and substituting into the right-hand side
of the above equation yields:
d
d" 
Et [bu (k (er1; :::; ert + "; :::; erT ))] = d
d" 
Et [u (V (er1; :::; ert + "; :::; erT+1))]j"=0
 g0 (at ) Et [bu0 (k (er1; :::; erT ))] :
Hence the IC constraint holds for contract k (er1; :::; erT ) and utility function bu at time
T , and so Condition (ii) of Statement T is satised. We can therefore apply Statement
T at T to contract k (r1; :::; rT ), utility function bu and cost function b dened by:
b (x)  E [ (x+ g0 (aT+1) erT+1)] : (45)
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We observe that the contract V 0 =
PT+1
t=1 g
0 (at ) rt +K satises:
E
"bu TX
t=1
g0 (at ) rt +K
!#
= E
"
u
 
T+1X
t=1
g0 (at ) rt +K
!#
= u:
Therefore, applying Statement T to k; bu and b implies:
Ck = E
hb (k (er1; :::; erT ))i  CV 0 = E
"

 
T+1X
t=1
g0 (at ) ert +K
!#
: (46)
Using equation (45) yields:
Ck = E [ (k (er1; :::; erT ) + g0 (aT+1) erT+1)]  CV 0 = E
"

 
T+1X
t=1
g0 (at ) ert +K
!#
:
Finally, we compare the cost of contract k (r1; :::; rT )+ g0 (aT+1) erT+1 to the cost of the
original contract V (r1; :::; rT+1). Since equation (41) is satised, we can apply Lemma 2
to the convex function   u 1 and the random variable erT+1 to yield
Et [ (V (er1; :::; erT+1))]  Et   k (er1; :::; erT ) + g0  aT+1 erT+1
E [ (V (er1; :::; erT+1))]  E   k (er1; :::; erT ) + g0  aT+1 erT+1 = Ck  CV 0 :
where the nal inequality comes from (46). Hence the cost of contract k is weakly greater
than the cost of contract V 0. This concludes the proof for T + 1.
3b). Optimality of Deterministic Contracts
Consider a randomized contract eV (r1; :::; rT ) and dene the certainty equivalent
contract V by:
u
 
V (r1; :::; rT )
  ET hueV (r1; :::; rT )i : (47)
We wish to apply Statement T (which we have already proven for deterministic contracts)
to contract V , and so must verify that its three conditions are satised.
From the above denition, we obtain
E

u
 
V (er1; :::; erT ) = E hueV (er1; :::; erT )i  u,
i.e., V satises the participation constraint (29). Hence, Condition (i) holds. Also, it is
clear that Condition (iii) holds for V , given it holds for eV . We thus need to show that
Condition (ii) is also satised. Applying Jensens inequality to equation (47) and the
function u0  u 1 (which is convex since u exhibits NIARA) yields: u0  V (r1; :::; rT ) 
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ET
h
u0
eV (r1; :::; rT )i. We apply this to rt = ert for t = 1:::T and take expectations to
obtain
Et
h
u0
eV (er1; :::; erT )i  Et u0  V (er1; :::; erT ) : (48)
Applying denition (47) to the left-hand side of (37) yields:
d
d" 
Et

u
 
V (er1; :::; ert + "; :::; erT )j"=0  g0 (at ) Et hu0 eV (er1; :::; ert; :::; erT )i :
and using (48) yields:
d
d" 
Et

u
 
V (er1; :::; ert + "; :::; erT )j"=0  g0 (at ) Et u0  V (er1; :::; ert; :::; erT ) :
Condition (ii) of Statement T therefore holds for V . We can therefore apply Statement
T to show that V 0 has a weakly lower cost than V . We next show that the cost of V
is weakly less than the cost of eV . Applying Jensens inequality to (47) and the convex
function  u 1 yields:   V (r1; :::; rT )  E heV (r1; :::; rT )i. We apply this to rt = ert
for t = 1:::T and take expectations over the distribution of ert to obtain:

 
V (er1; :::; erT )  E heV (er1; :::; erT )i :
Hence V has a weakly lower cost than eV . Therefore, V 0 has a weakly lower cost than eV .
This proves the Statement for randomized contracts.
3c). Main Proof. Having proven Statement T , we now turn to the main proof of
Theorem 1. The value of the signal on the equilibrium path is given by ert  at + et. We
dene
u (x)  u
 
x 
TX
s=1
g (as)
!
: (49)
We seek to use Statement T applied to function u and random variable ert, and thus must
verify that its three conditions are satised. Since E
h
u
eV (er1; :::; erT )i  u, Condition
(i) holds.
The IC constraint for time t is:
0 2 argmax
"
Et u
 eV (a1 + e1; :::; at + et + "; :::; aT + eT )  g (at + ")  X
s=1:::T;s 6=t
g (as)
!
;
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i.e.
0 2 argmax
"
Et u
 eV (er1; :::; ert + "; :::; erT )  g (at + ")  X
s=1:::T;s 6=t
g (as)
!
: (50)
We note that, for a function f ("), 0 2 argmax" f (") implies that for all " < 0,
(f (0)  f (")) = ( ")  0, hence, taking the lim infy"0, we obtain dd" f 0  (")j"=0  0.
Call X (") the argument of u in equation (50). Applying this result to (50), we nd:
d
d"  Et u (X ("))j"=0  0.
Using Lemma 5, we nd Et
h
u0 (X (0))

d
d" X (")j"=0
i
 0. Using Lemma 6, d
d" X (")j"=0 =
d
d" 
eV (er1; :::; ert + "; :::; erT )  g0 (at ), hence we obtain:
Et

u0 (X (0))

d
d" 
eV (er1; :::; ert + "; :::; erT )  g0 (at )  0:
Using again Lemma 5, this can be rewritten:
d
d" 
Et
"
u
 eV (er1; :::; ert + "; :::; erT )  X
s=1:::T
g (as)
!#
j"=0
 g0 (at ) Et [u0 (X (0))] ;
i.e., using the notation (49),
d
d" 
Et
h
u
eV (er1; :::; ert + "; :::; erT )ij"=0  g0 (at ) Et hu0 eV (er1; :::; ert; :::; erT )i :
Therefore, Condition (ii) of Statement T holds.
Finally, we verify Condition (iii). Apply (50) to signal rt and deviation " < 0. We
obtain:
Et
"
u
 eV (er1; :::; ert + "; :::; erT )  X
s=1:::T
g (as)
!#
 Et
"
u
 eV (er1; :::; ert + "; :::; erT )  g (at + ")  X
s=1:::T;s 6=t
g (as)
!#
 Et
"
u
 eV (r1; :::; rt + "; :::; rT )  g (at )  X
s=1:::T;s 6=t
g (as)
!#
;
so Condition (iii) holds for contract eV and utility function u.
We can now apply Statement T to contract eV and function u, to prove that any
globally IC contract is weakly costlier than contract V 0 =
PT
t=1 g
0 (at ) rt +K. Moreover,
it is clear that V 0 satises the global IC conditions in equation (50). Thus, V 0 is the
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cheapest contract that satises the global IC constraint.
Proof of Proposition 1
Conditionally on (t)tT+1, we must have:
aT+1 2 argmax
aT+1
u
 
V
 
a1 + 1; :::; a

T+1 + T+1
  g (aT+1)  X
t6=T+1
g (at )
!
:
Using the proof of Theorem 1 with T = 1, this implies that, for rT+1 in the interior of the
support of erT+1 (given (rt)tT ), V (r1; :::; rT+1) can be written:
V (r1; :::; rT+1) = KT (r1; :::; rT ) + g
0  aT+1 rT+1;
for some function KT (r1; :::; rT ). Next, consider the problem of implementing action aT
at time T . We require that, for all (t)tT ,
aT 2 argmax
aT
ET
"
u
 
KT (a

1 + 1; :::; a

T + T ) + g
0  aT+1  T+1 + aT+1  g (aT ) X
t6=T
g (at )
!#
:
This can be rewritten
aT 2 argmax
aT
bu (KT (a1 + 1; :::; aT + T )  g (aT )) ;
where bu (x)  E hux+ g0  aT+1  T+1 + aT+1 Pt6=T g (at ) j 1; :::; Ti.
Using the same arguments as above for T + 1, that implies that, for rT in the interior
of the support of erT (given (rt)tT 1) we can write:
KT (r1; :::; rT ) = KT 1 (r1; :::; rT 1) + g0 (aT ) rT
for some function KT 1 (r1; :::; rT   1). Proceeding by induction, we see that this implies
that we can write, for (rt)tT+1 in the interior of the support of (ert)tT+1,
VT+1 (r1; :::; rT+1) =
T+1X
t=1
g0 (at ) rt +K0;
for some constant K0. This yields the necessaryrst part of the Proposition.
The converse part of the Proposition is immediate. Given the proposed contract, the
37
agent faces the decision:
max
(at)tT
E
"
u
 
TX
t=1
g0 (at ) at   g (at) +
TX
t=1
g0 (at ) t
!#
;
which is maximized pointwise when g0 (at ) at g (at) is maximized. This in turn requiresat =
at .
Proof of Theorem 2
We shall use the following purely mathematical Lemma, proven in the Online Appen-
dix.
Lemma 7 Consider a standard Brownian process Zt with ltration Ft, a determinis-
tic non-negative process t, an Ft adapted process t, T  0, X =
R T
0
tdZt, and
Y =
R T
0
tdZt. Suppose that almost surely, 8t 2 [0; T ], t  t. Then X second-order
stochastically dominates Y .
Lemma 7 is intuitive: since t  t  0, it makes sense that Y is more volatile than
X.
To derive the IC constraint, we use the methodology introduced by Sannikov (2008).
We observe that the term
R T
0
tdt induces a constant shift, so w.l.o.g we can assume t = 0
8 t.
For an arbitrary adapted policy function a = (at)t2[0;T ], let Q
a denote the probability
measures induced by a. Then, Zat =
R t
0
(drs   asds) =s is a Brownian motion under Qa,
and Za

t =
R t
0
(drs   asds) =s is a Brownian under Qa, where a is the policy (at )t2[0;T ] :
Recall that, if the agent exerts policy a, then rt =
R t
0
asds + sdZs. We dene vT =
v (c). By the martingale representation theorem (Karatzas and Shreve (1991), p. 182)
applied to process vt = Et [vT ] for t 2 [0; T ], we can write: vT =
R T
0
t (drt   atdt) + v0 for
some constant v0 and a process t adapted to the ltration induced by (rs)st.
We proceed in two steps.
1) We show that policy a is optimal for the agent if and only if, for almost all t 2 [0; T ]:
at 2 argmax
at
tat   g (at) : (51)
To prove this claim, consider another action policy (at), adapted to the ltration in-
duced by (Zs)st. Consider the value W = vT  
R T
0
g (at) dt, so that the nal utility for
the agent under policy a is u (W ). Dening L  R T
0
[tat   g (at)  tat + g (at )] dt, it can
be rewritten
W = v0 +
Z T
0
t (drt   atdt) 
Z T
0
g (at ) dt+ L:
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Suppose that (51) is not veried on the set  of times with positive measure. Then,
consider a policy a such that tat g (at) > tat  g (at ) for t 2  , and at = at on [0; T ]n .
We thus have L > 0. Consider the agents utility under policy a:
Ua = Ea

u

vT  
Z T
0
g (at) dt

= Ea

u

v0 +
Z T
0
t (drt   atdt) 
Z T
0
g (at ) dt+ L

= Ea

u

v0 +
Z T
0
ttdZ
a
t  
Z T
0
g (at ) dt+ L

> Ea

u

v0 +
Z T
0
ttdZ
a
t  
Z T
0
g (at ) dt

since L > 0
= Ea


u

v0 +
Z T
0
ttdZ
a
t  
Z T
0
g (at ) dt

= Ea


u

vT  
Z T
0
g (at ) dt

= Ua

;
where Ua is the agents utility under policy a. Hence, as Ua > Ua, the IC condition is
violated. We conclude that condition (51) is necessary for the contract to satisfy the IC
condition.
We next show that condition (51) is also su¢ cient to satisfy the IC condition. Indeed,
consider any adapted policy a. Then, L  0. So, the above reasoning shows that Ua  Ua.
Policy a is at least as good as any alternative strategy a.
2) We show that cost-minimization entails t = g0 (at ).
(51) implies t = g0 (at ) if a

t 2 (a; a), and t  g0 (a) if at = a.
The case where at 2 (a; a) 8 t is straightforward. The IC contract must have the form:
v (cT ) = v0 +
Z T
0
g0 (at ) (drt   atdt) =
Z T
0
g0 (at ) drt +K;
where K = v0 +
R T
0
g0 (at ) a

tdt. Cost minimization entails the lowest possible v0.
The case where at = a for some t is more complex, since the IC constraint is only an
inequality: t  t  g0 (at ). We must therefore prove this inequality binds. Consider
X =
Z T
0
ttdzt, Y =
Z T
0
ttdzt:
By reshifting u (x)! u

x  R T
0
g (at ) dt

if necessary, we can assume
R T
0
g (at ) dt = 0
to simplify notation.
We wish to show that a contract vT = Y +KY , with E [u (Y +KY )]  u, has a weakly
greater expected cost than a contract v = X +KX , with E [u (X +KX)] = u. Lemma 7
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implies that E [u (X +KX)]  E [u (Y +KX)], and so
E [u (Y +KX)]  E [u (X +KX)] = u  [u (Y +KY )] :
Thus, KX  KY . Since v is increasing and concave, v 1 is convex and  v 1 is concave.
We can therefore apply Lemma 7 to function  v 1 to yield:
E

v 1 (X +KX)
  E v 1 (Y +KX)  E v 1 (Y +KY ) ;
where the second inequality follows from KX  KY . Therefore, the expected cost of
v = X+KX is weakly less that of Y +KY , and so contract v = X+KX is cost-minimizing.
More explicitly, that is the contract (20) with K = KX +
R T
0
g0 (at ) a

tdt.
Proof of Theorem 3
We prove the Theorem by induction.
Proof of Theorem 3 for T = 1. We remove time subscripts and let V (b) = v (C (b))
denote the felicity received by the agent if he announces b and signal A (b)+ b is revealed.
If the agent reports , the principal expects to see signal  + A (). Therefore, if the
agent deviates to report b 6= , he must take action a such that  + a = b + A (b), i.e.
a = A (b) + b   . Hence, the truth-telling constraint is: 8;8b,
V (b)  g (A (b) + b   )  V ()  g (A ()) : (52)
Dening
 ()  V ()  g (A ()) ;
the truth-telling constraint (52) can be rewritten,
g (A (b))  g (A (b) + b   )   ()   (b) : (53)
Rewriting this inequality interchanging  and b and combining with the original inequality
(53) yields:
8;8b : g (A (b))  g (A (b) + b   )   ()  (b)  g (A () +    b)  g (A ()) : (54)
Consider a point  where A is continuous and take b < . Dividing (54) by    b > 0
and taking the limit b "  yields  0left () = g0 (A ()). Next, consider b > . Dividing (54)
by    b < 0 and taking the limit b #  yields  0right () = g0 (A ()). Hence,
 0 () = g0 (A ()) ; (55)
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at all points  where A is continuous.
Equation (55) holds only almost everywhere, since we have only assumed that A is
almost everywhere continuous. To complete the proof, we require a regularity argument
about  (otherwise  might jump, for instance). We will show that  is absolutely
continuous (see, e.g., Rudin (1987), p.145). Consider a compact subinterval I, and aI =
sup fA () +    b j ; b 2 Ig, which is nite because A is assumed to be bounded in any
compact subinterval of . Then, equation (54) implies:
j ()   (b)j  max fjg (A (b))  g (A (b) + b   )j ; g (A () +    b)  g (A ())g  j   bj (sup g0)I .
This implies that  is absolutely continuous on I. Therefore, by the fundamental
theorem of calculus for almost everywhere di¤erentiable functions (Rudin (1987), p.148),
we have that for any ; ,  () =  () +
R 
  
0 (x) dx. From (55),  () =  () +R 
 g
0 (A (x)) dx, i.e.
V () = g (A ()) +
Z 

g0 (A (x)) dx+ k (56)
with k =  (). This concludes the proof for T = 1.
Proof that if Theorem 3 holds for T , it holds for T +1. This part of the proof is as the
proof of Theorem 1 in the main text. At t = T +1, if the agent reports bT+1, he must take
action a = A (bT+1) + bT+1   T+1 so that the signal a+ T+1 is consistent with declaringbT+1. The IC constraint is therefore:
T+1 2 argmaxbT+1 V (1; :::; T ; bT+1)  g (A (bT+1) + bT+1   T+1) 
TX
t=1
g (at ) : (57)
Applying the result for T = 1, to induce bT+1 = T+1, the contract must be of the form:
V (1; :::; T ; bT+1) =WT+1 (bT+1) + k (1; :::; T ) ; (58)
where WT+1 (bT+1) = g (A (bT+1)) + R bT+1 g0 (A (x)) dx and k (1; :::; T ) is the constant
viewed from period T + 1.
In turn, k (1; :::; T ) must be chosen to implement bt = t 8t = 1:::T , viewed from
time 0, when the agents utility is:
E
"
u
 
k (1; :::; T ) +WT+1 (bT+1)  TX
t=1
g (at)
!#
:
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Dening bu (x) = E [u (x+WT+1 (eT+1))] ; (59)
the principals problem is to implement b = t 8t = 1:::T , with a contract k (1; :::; T ),
given a utility function E
hbuk (1; :::; T ) PTt=1 g (at)i. Applying the result for T , we
see that k must be:
k (1; :::; T ) =
TX
t=1
g (At (t)) +
TX
t=1
Z t

g0 (At (x)) dx+ k
for some constant k. Combining this with (56), the only incentive compatible contract is:
V (1; :::; T ; T+1) =
T+1X
t=1
g (At (t)) +
T+1X
t=1
Z t

g0 (At (x)) dx+ k:
Proof of Theorem 4
First, it is clear we can restrict ourselves to A ()  a for all . If for some , A () > a,
the principal will be weakly better o¤ by implementing A () = a instead, since rm value
S E

b
 
min
 
A (e) ; a ; e is unchanged, and the cost E [v 1 (V (e))] will weakly decrease.
Let C (A) denote the expected cost of implementing A (), i.e. C (A) = E [v 1 (C ())]
where C () is given by Theorem 3. The following Lemma states that the cost of e¤ort is
a Lipschitz-continuous function of the level of e¤ort. Its proof is in the Online Appendix.
Lemma 8 Suppose that g00 is bounded and that supx F (x) =f (x) <1. There is a constant
, given by equation (25) such that, for any two contracts that implement actions A ()
and B () in (a,a], the di¤erence in the implementation costs satises: jC (A)  C (B)j 
E jA () B ()j.
By Lemma 8, we have jC0   Cj  E a  A (). Next, let W 0 (respectively, W )
denote the value of the principals surplus (24) under the contract implementing a (re-
spectively, A ()) and dene m = infa; @b@a (a; ). The di¤erence in total payo¤ to the rm
is:
W 0  W = S E b  a;   C0   (S E [b (A () ; )]  C) = S E b  a;   b (A () ; )   C0   C
 SmE a  A ()  E a  A () = (Sm  )E a  A () :
Therefore, when S > S  =m, W 0   W > 0 unless E
a  A () = 0. Hence, a
contract that implements maximal e¤ort for all noise realizations is optimal.
42
C A Microfoundation for the Principals Objective
We o¤er a microfoundation for the principals objective function (24). Suppose that the
agent can take two actions, a fundamentalaction aF 2 (a; a] and a manipulative action
m  0. Firm value is a function of aF only, i.e. the benet function is b  aF ; . The signal
is increasing in both actions: r = aF+m+. The agents utility is v (c) gF (a) +G (m),
where g, G are increasing and convex, G (0) = 0, and G0 (0)  g0  a. The nal assumption
means that manipulation is costlier than fundamental e¤ort.
We dene a = aF+m and the cost function g (a) = minaf ;M

gF (a) +G (m) j aF +m = a	,
so that g (a) = gF (a) for a 2 (a; a] and g (a) = gF (a) + g (m  a) for a  a, which is
increasing and convex. Then, rm value can be written b
 
min
 
a; a

; e, as in equation
(24).
This framework is consistent with rational expectations. Suppose b
 
aF ; 

= eaF+.
After observing the signal r, the market forms its expectation P1 of the rm value b
 
aF ; 

.
The incentive contract described in Theorem 3 implements a  a, so the agent will not
engage in manipulation. Therefore, the rational expectations price is P1 = er.
In more technical terms, consider the game in which the agent takes action a and the
market sets price P1 after observing signal r. It is a Bayesian Nash equilibrium for the
agent to choose A () and for the market to set price P1 = er.
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